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Abstract — In a simple oligopsonistic model, firms compete for labour through
wages and job qualities. We modify the product market model developed by
Vandenbosch/Weinberg 1995 and apply it to the job market with jobs being
defined by two vertically differentiated non-wage characteristics. Workers dif-
fer in their valuation of these two characteristics but do not differ in their
productivity. In equilibrium firms offer different wages and differ in only one
of these non-wage characteristics. Whereas our labour market model is based
on firms, we apply subclasses according to the UK SIC(2003) in our empiri-
cal analysis. When comparing subclasses within selected sectors (WERS) we
found evidence that firms compete in both wages and job qualities.
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1 Introduction
Simple perfect competition labour market models can hardly describe typical real labour
market situations. The assumption of homogeneous workers and working places is evi-
dently disproved. Wage dispersion is a robust phenomenon. Recently models of imperfect
competition, borrowed from Industrial Organization, are used to incorporate features of
oligopsony, that is the incorporation of wage setting power by firms (for a survey see
Bhaskar, Manning and To 2002). Typical features of such models are wages lower than in
competitive markets, employment increasing effects of minimum wages or wage dispersion
(for example Bhaskar and To 2003).
Work places (and wage differentiation) are usually coupled with differentiated non-
wage job characteristics. These differences can be characterized vertically or horizontally.
Jobs are differentiated vertically if all workers agree in the ordering of that characteristic.
Training possibilities or job security are probably examples for vertical job characteristics.
These characteristics are often connected with the term quality. Workers do not agree on
the ordering of a horizontal job characteristic. Geographic location or hours to work may
be examples for horizontal job characteristics.
Important is that in most cases these characteristics are not fixed for the firms. To the
contrary, firms can design their work places and can compete not only by the wage rate but
also by non-wage job characteristics. Firms may be able to improve their profits by setting
these characteristics in a strategic way. E.g. several studies for the non-profit sector have
shown that non-profit employers offer lower wages but better working conditions. A
good survey is given by Powell and Steinberg (2006), Chapter 7 for example. Almond
and Kendall (2000) show for the United Kingdom, by comparing objective measured job
characteristics, that non-profit workers receive higher flexibility in work arrangements as
well as higher levels of training but they have to do more unpaid overtime than workers
in the for-profit and government sector. Preston (1990) pointed out that these offers of
flexibility may be an explanation for the overrepresentation of women in the non-profit
sector. Thus there is evidence that non-profit firms do compete for workers against for-
profit firms by offering for example more flexibility in the work schedule.
In the industrial organization literature a huge number of articles analyze the reasons
for (product-)differentiation. Beginning with Hotelling (1929) who argued that a con-
siderable differentiation is unlikely to be observed, because firms competing for market
shares will supply products that are favourable for the median buyer.
This principle of minimal differentiation was disputed from the beginning (for early
contributions see Lerner and Singer (1937) or Smithies (1941)). Only in 1979 d’Aspremont,
Gabszewicz and Thisse detected an error in Hotelling’s argument. They showed that in
Hotelling’s linear city model with linear transportation costs no price equilibrium exists
and therefore the product differentiation stage is not well defined. They found that with
quadratic transportation costs, a price equilibrium exists and maximal differentiation is
the best firms can do in a linear city (given evenly distributed buyers). To differentiate
the characteristic as large as possible soften price competition. In general two opposite
effects arise with product or job differentiation. The first effect is the market size effect,
emphasized by Hotelling. The second effect accentuates monopolization and is called the
strategic effect (Tirole 1988). Firms differentiate their products to avoid price competi-
tion.
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There exist several papers in Industrial Organization analyzing situations with more
than one characteristic. Neven and Thisse (1990) work with two characteristics, a vertical
and a horizontal one. Vandenbosch and Weinberg (1995) analyze two vertical character-
istics and Irmen and Thisse (1998) examine a situation with two or more horizontal
characteristics. All three papers found a common solution with maximal differentiation
in one of the characteristics and no differentiation with the other characteristic (at least
one of the equilibria is of the described type). Thus both effects described above are
working in these models. Firms will differentiate in one of the characteristics to avoid
price competition and, at the same time, will choose the second characteristic in a way
to favour the median buyer.
In this paper we reinterpret Vandenbosch and Weinberg (1995) in an oligopsonistic
labour market view. Firms offer jobs which are characterized by two non-wage charac-
teristics. Both characteristics are vertically differentiated, that means that in the view of
all potential workers there exist an optimal specification of the job (we will call this the
qualities of the job). But workers differ in their willingness to substitute these qualities
for wage. Firms may offer differentiated jobs to discriminate between workers who call for
high quality and workers who are willing to accept lower quality in exchange for higher
wages. In equilibrium wages will be differentiated and, as usual in oligopsonistic markets,
wages will be lower than in a competitive labour market. In addition a social planer would
offer higher average qualities than firms will offer in the market process. In equilibrium
firms will differentiate jobs only in one of the (two) characteristics.
Bhaskar and To (2003) present an oligopsonistic model, where workers with the same
productivity earn differentiated wages. They analyze a model, based on a product market
model by Salop (1979), with one horizontal job characteristic in a circular city. To get
differentiated wages they need heterogeneous employers in the sense that the marginal
product of labour varies between the employers. Firms do not choose the differentiated job
characteristic, it is given by the model design and is no issue in their paper. In our model
the marginal product of labour is the same in all (both) firms, wages are differentiated
because firms choose to differ in the non-wage job characteristics.
To get a feeling on the empirical relevance of our argument we use the dataset WERS
(Workplace Employment Relations Survey1) to compare non-wage characteristics between
several subclasses (UK SIC(2003)) of the economy. WERS is an employee-employer data.
Job characteristics are measured on an ordinal, subjective basis. By comparing subclasses,
using a Mann-Whitney-Test to test for differentiated populations of the subclasses, we
found some evidence that firms do compete in one of the job characteristics in order to
retain and attract employees.
2 Model
In our simple model workplaces are vertically differentiated by characteristics a and b,
with a ∈ [amin, amax] and b ∈ [bmin, bmax]. Both characteristics measure quality. Two firms
offer jobs with characteristics (a1, b1) and (a2, b2) (each firm offer only one bundle). Both
firms can choose these characteristics without bearing any costs.
Figure 1 shows three possible job specifications of firm 1. In point A firm 1 is offering
1Kersley, Alpin, Forth, Bryson, Bewley, Dix and Oxenbridge (2006) give a description of this survey.
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bmin b1 bmax
amin
a1
amax
A
C
B
Figure 1: Quality of workplace in firm 1
both characteristics at the highest quality (given the wage, all workers would prefer this
specification). In B characteristic a is offered at its lowest quality, while characteristic
b is offered at an intermediate level. In C the quality of both characteristics lies in
the intermediate range. Keep in mind, that the ranges of characteristics a and b can
differ in principle, but we will simplify the model by forcing the same range for both
characteristics. The effects of loosening this assumption will be discussed in short at the
end of this section.
Workers labour supply is completely inelastic, but they differ in their willingness to
substitute high quality for wage. This willingness is represented by tia and t
i
b, with i
being the index for workers. Workers differ only in these valuation parameters, which are
independently and uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1]. Given the same wage for
all specifications, whether a worker prefers specification B over specification C in Figure
1 depends on his or her valuation parameters tia and t
i
b (A is the best configuration for all
workers, but comparing B to C, individual workers can disagree). The utility a worker
i receives from a job j is given by wj + t
i
aaj + t
i
bbj. We assume that this utility is high
enough that all workers will supply their labour.
Worker i, who is characterized completely by [tia, t
i
b], is indifferent to work in firm 1 or
in firm 2 if
w1 + t
i
aa1 + t
i
bb1 = w2 + t
i
aa2 + t
i
bb2 (1)
(In what follows, we will suppress the index i).
Given (1) we can describe all workers who are indifferent to work in firm 1 or 2, given
wages and non-wage characteristics, by the indifference line
ta =
w2 − w1
a1 − a2 −
b1 − b2
a1 − a2 tb (2)
for all a1 6= a2. (If a1 = a2 we can invert the indifference line. In that case we need
b1 6= b2. If firms do not differ in at least one characteristic, an indifference line is not
defined, all workers prefer to work in the firm offering the higher wage.)
Figure 2 shows such an indifference line (each point in the [ta, tb] space characterizes
exactly one worker). Assume w2 > w1, all workers below the indifference line will work
in firm 2, all worker above the line in firm 1.
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tb0 1
ta
1
0
ta
tˆa
L1
L2
Figure 2: Indifference line
Only if both firms pay the same wage, the indifference line goes through the point
(0,0). (The decision of the worker characterized by the point (0,0)—he or she is the
only worker who does not care about quality in both characteristics—is based on wages
only). The intercept of the indifference line depends negatively on the quotient of the
wage difference and the quality difference in characteristic a.
The slope of the indifference line is positive if each firm has an advantage in one of the
characteristics (Vandenbosch and Weinberg (1995) call this asymmetric characteristics
competition). If firm 1 offers higher quality in characteristic a, firm 2 offers higher quality
in characteristic b and vice versa. The slope of the indifference line is less than one if the
difference between the offered characteristic b is smaller than the difference between the
offers in characteristic a.
The slope of the indifference line is negative if one firm offers higher quality in both
characteristics (dominated characteristics competition). In this case if wages are the same
in both firms, all workers will work in the firm with the higher quality of workplaces. For
a positive quantity of labour the firm with the lower quality has to offer a higher wage
than its competitor.
We analyze a two stage game. In stage 1 firms decide simultaneously over the quality
of their workplaces (a1, b1 respectively a2, b2). Firms can offer any quality without costs.
In stage 2 firms simultaneously select their wages. Given the quality of the workplaces and
the wages, workers are allocated according their valuation parameters. We use subgame-
perfection in pure strategies as equilibrium concept. Therefore, we start to analyze stage
2, to find equilibrium wages for all quality variations. Given the wage equilibrium we can
then analyze the quality setting stage.
This game has several equilibria. In what follows, we will derive the unique equilibrium
for amax = bmax = c and amin = bmin = c (so Figure 1 will be a square). With different
ranges for the characteristics additional equilibria occur. We will discuss these equilibria
at the end of the section. In the empirical part of the paper (Section 3) the characteristics
are measured by a subjective ordinal measure, therefore the meaning of the range of a
characteristic is nonspecific in some respect.
Let us start with an indifference line as in Figure 2. The indifference line inter-
sects both vertical boundaries within the interval [0,1]. The slope of the indifference line
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(−(b1 − b2)/(a1 − a2)) must be in the interval [-1,1].
Assumption 1 : a1 > a2
In this case the indifference line insects the left vertical axis only if w2 > w1 and
all workers below the indifference line will work in firm 2, all workers above the
indifference line will work in firm 1.
Assumption 2 : 0 ≤ ta = w2 − w1
a1 − a2 ≤ 1
The indifference line intersects the left boarder within [0,1].
Assumption 3 : 0 ≤ tˆa = w2 − w1
a1 − a2 −
b1 − b2
a1 − a2 ≤ 1
The indifference line intersects the right boarder line within [0,1].
Labor assigned to firm 2 is given by the area under the indifference line.
L2 = ta +
(tˆa − ta)
2
=
w2 − w1
a1 − a2 −
b1 − b2
2(a1 − a2) (3)
Labor assigned to firm 1 is
L1 = 1− L2 (4)
These equations show that the firm specific labour supply functions are upward sloping,
typical for monopsonistic or oligopsonistic models.
2.1 Wage Competition
In stage 2 firms will set the wages to maximize profit. We allow for interfirm wage
differentiation, within a firm all workers receive the same wage. We apply a very simple
production function, the marginal productivity of all workers is the same and constant.
Firm i ’s profit is given by
pii = (p− wi)Li (5)
with p is the common constant value of the (marginal) product of labour. Firms choose
wages to maximize their profit.
∂pii
∂wi
= −Li + (p− wi)∂Li
∂wi
= 0 (6)
We get the standard upward sloping reaction functions for firm 1 and 2
w1 =
p+ w2 − (a1 − a2)− b1−b22
2
and w2 =
p+ w1 +
b1−b2
2
2
(7)
Both reaction functions are increasing with slope 1
2
.
The intersection of the reaction functions gives the equilibrium in the wage game.
w1 = p− 2(a1 − a2)
3
− b1 − b2
6
(8)
5
w2 = p− a1 − a2
3
+
b1 − b2
6
(9)
Note that w1 decreases with the qualities (a1 and b1) of firm 1’s job offer and increases
with the qualities of the competitor. On the other hand w2 increases with firm 2’s quality
a2 and decrease with b2, while w2 reacts in the opposite direction with the qualities of
firm 1.
The difference between firm 1’s and firm 2’s wage is
w2 − w1 = (a1 − a2) + (b1 − b2)
3
(10)
Using (4) and (3) we get
L1 =
2
3
+
b1 − b2
6(a1 − a2) and L2 =
1
3
− b1 − b2
6(a1 − a2) (11)
Profits are given therefore by
pi1 = (a1 − a2)L12 and pi2 = (a1 − a2)L22 (12)
2.2 Choice of quality
Given the solution of stage 1 we can now analyze the non-wage competition stage given
assumption 1 to 3. Both firms can choose the two characteristics a and b within the
boundaries [c, c]. They will do this so as to maximize profit. We can describe the firms’
choices by describing
dpii
dci
, where ci stands for the two characteristics a and b.
dpii
dci
= −dwi
dci
Li + (p− wi)
(
∂Li
∂ci
+
∂Li
∂wi
dwi
dci
+
∂Li
∂wj
dwj
dci
)
(13)
Using (6) we can describe the derivative by
⇒ dpii
dci
=
∂Li
∂ci
+
∂Li
∂wj
dwj
dci
(14)
The first effect is called market size effect, while the second effect is called the strategic
effect by Tirole (1988).
Evaluating these derivatives, we get (remember the slope of the indifference line is in
the interval [-1,1])
sign
(
dpi1
da1
)
= sign
(
4− b1 − b2
a1 − a2
)
> 0 (15)
sign
(
dpi1
db1
)
= sign
(
2
3(a1 − a2)
)
> 0 (16)
sign
(
dpi2
da2
)
= sign
(
−2− b1 − b2
a1 − a2
)
< 0 (17)
sign
(
dpi2
db2
)
= sign
(
2
3(a1 − a2)
)
> 0 (18)
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Therefore, firm 1 offers the highest quality in both characteristics.
a1 = amax = c, b1 = bmax = c (19)
Contrary to firm 1, firm 2 offers the highest quality in characteristic b, but to avoid
an outstanding wage competition it offers poor quality in characteristic a combined with
a higher wage than firm 1.2 Workers with a low valuation of quality in characteristic a
will prefer to work in firm 2.
a2 = amin = c, b2 = bmax = c (20)
Both equilibrium wages depend only on the productivity of the workers and on spec-
ification of characteristic a. Equilibrium wages, firms employment and profits are given
below.
w1 = p− 2(c− c)
3
, w2 = p− (c− c)
3
(21)
L1 =
2
3
and L2 =
1
3
(22)
pi1 =
4(c− c)
9
and pi2 =
(c− c)
9
(23)
Substituting the results into the indifference line, we get a horizonal line at ta =
1
3
, so
assumptions 1 to 3 are fulfilled.
tb0 1
ta
1
0
1
3
L1
L2
Figure 3: Equilibrium
Wages are differentiated, even though all workers have the same productivity. The
solution is asymmetric, firm 1 offers higher quality (in one of the characteristics) and has
to pay a lower wage. The wage difference depends on the maximal possible difference of
quality (c− c).
Note that the social planer would set the highest qualities in both firms. The reason
is that the overall employment is constant, thus only the utility gains from offering high
quality matter.
We have to proof, if the equilibrium is a global one. Therefore we have to analyze
situations where the indifference line intersects one of the horizontal boarder lines.
2With the same qualities in both firms, wage competition will be high and the wage would rise up to
the marginal product p, absorbing all profit.
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Case A1: Indifference line intersects the left vertical and the lower horizontal boarder
lines (see Figure 4). The slope of the indifference line has to be negative. w2 > w1
tb0 1
ta
1
0
ta
tb
Figure 4: Case A1
ta =
w2 − w1
a1 − a2 and tb =
w2 − w1
b1 − b2 (24)
L2 =
tatb
2
(25)
w1 = p− 3
√
2(a1 − a2)(b1 − b2)
4
and w2 = p−
√
2(a1 − a2)(b1 − b2)
4
(26)
dpi1
da1
> 0
dpi1
db1
> 0 (27)
dpi2
da2
< 0
dpi2
db2
< 0 (28)
⇒ a1 = c, b1 = c, a2 = c, b2 = c (29)
pi∗1 =
9
√
2
16
(c− c) and pi∗2 =
√
2
16
(c− c) (30)
Firm 1 selects the same strategy as in the main text. To determine the Nash equi-
librium, we have to compare profit of firm 2 with the different strategies. Given our
assumptions firm 2’s profit is clearly higher with the max–min strategy, therefore consti-
tuting the equilibrium.
If the range of the characteristics is different and the range of the characteristic b is
sufficient larger than that of characteristic a, that is bmax−bmin > 2(amax−amin), then firm
2 will choose the min–min strategy (see Vandenbosch and Weinberg 1995). A third type
of equilibrium arise, if 1
2
(bmax − bmin) < amax − amin < 81128(bmax − bmin). The equilibrium
locations will be a1 = amax, b1 = bmax, a2 = amax − 12(bmax − bmin), and b2 = bmax in this
case.
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tb0 1
ta
1
0
tˆb
tˆa
Figure 5: Case A2
Case A2: Indifference line intersects the upper horizontal and the right vertical boarder
lines (see Figure 5). The slope of the indifference line has to be negative. w2 > w1
tˆa =
w2 − w1
a1 − a2 −
b1 − b2
a1 − a2 and tˆb =
w2 − w1
b1 − b2 −
a1 − a2
b1 − b2 (31)
L1 =
(1− tˆa)(1− tˆb)
2
(32)
w1 = p−
√
(a1 − a2)2 + (b1 − b2)2 + 10(a1 − a2)(b1 − b2)
8
− (a1 − a2) + (b1 − b2)
8
w2 = p− 3
√
(a1 − a2)2 + (b1 − b2)2 + 10(a1 − a2)(b1 − b2)
8
+
5((a1 − a2) + (b1 − b2))
8
(33)
In this case, tˆa will not be in the interval [0,1] and no price equilibrium exists.
Case A3: Indifference line intersects the left vertical and the upper horizontal boarder
lines (see Figure 6). The slope of the indifference line has to be positive.
ta =
w2 − w1
a1 − a2 and tˆb =
w2 − w1
b1 − b2 −
a1 − a2
b1 − b2 (34)
for b1 6= b2.
L1 =
(1− ta)tˆb
2
(35)
w1 = p− a1 − a2
8
−
√
(a1 − a2)2 − 8(a1 − a2)(b1 − b2)
8
w2 = p+
5(a1 − a2)
8
− 3
√
(a1 − a2)2 − 8(a1 − a2)(b1 − b2)
8
(36)
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tb0 1
ta
1
0
ta
tˆb
Figure 6: Case A3
Substituting equilibrium wages back into tˆb, we get value out of the interval [0,1] and
no price equilibrium exists.
Case A4: Indifference line intersects the lower horizontal and the right vertical boarder
lines (see Figure 7). The slope of the indifference line has to be positive. w2 < w1 in this
case.
tb0 1
ta
1
0
tb
tˆa
Figure 7: Case A4
tb =
w2 − w1
b1 − b2 and tˆa =
w2 − w1
a1 − a2 −
b1 − b2
a1 − a2 (37)
for a1 6= a2.
L2 =
(1− tb)tˆa
2
(38)
w1 = p− 5(b1 − b2)
8
− 3
√
(b1 − b2)2 − 8(a1 − a2)(b1 − b2)
8
w2 = p+
b1 − b2
8
−
√
(b1 − b2)2 − 8(a1 − a2)(b1 − b2)
8
(39)
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Substituting equilibrium wages back into tb, we get value out of the interval [0,1] and
no price equilibrium exists.
3 Empirical Investigation
3.1 Data and Method
Data We make use of the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) 2004
for our empirical investigation3. WERS is a comprehensive survey on establishment or
workplace level and covers both private and public sectors4. It comprises around 2300
workplaces, 1000 employee representatives and 22500 employees5. The advantage of this
dataset for our purposes is the selection of up to 25 employees in each workplace, thus
very advantageous for a convincing statistical test on firm and (UK SIC2003) subclass
level respectively. In contrast to our quantitative derivation of the results in section 2 the
variables we use here are qualitative. Thus they can be measured only on a nominal or
ordinal basis. Furthermore we do not rely on objective measures of working conditions,
but rather subjective perceptions about job characteristics in the WERS.
Method To check our theoretical hypothesis we use firms of 29 subclasses following
the UK Standard Industry Classification 2003 (UK SIC(2003)). Subclasses were selected
due to similarity of the produced goods and furthermore in which subclasses most indi-
viduals were interviewed6. From these selected employees we highlight questions about
the satisfaction of the employees with some characteristics of their jobs. These vari-
ables comprise for example satisfaction with training or job security. In what follows
for reasons of convenience we use only abbreviations of the variables investigated, these
are: ACHIEVEMENT, INITIATIVE, INFLUENCE, TRAINING, SATPAY, SECURITY
and WORK7. Due to strong correlation among the chosen variables, factor analysis was
required to reduce their number. We found that ACHIEVEMENT, INFLUENCE, INI-
TIATIVE and WORK can be grouped together into one variable (in the following “F1”),
similarly TRAINING and JOB SECURITY (in the following “F2”). As a result we finally
get 2 variables (F1, F2) and SATPAY8. After merging variables to factors we apply non-
parametric Mann-Whitney tests to investigate if job characteristics are different between
subclasses or not9.
3WERS is a survey for the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Economic and Social Re-
search Council (ESRC), the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (Acas) and the Policy Studies
Institute(PSI).
4It covers all workplaces with ≥ 5 employees in Great Britain engaged in activities within sectors D
to O of the UK Standard Industry Classification 2003 (UK SIC(2003)).
5The survey contains a questionnaire to employees, managers and employee representatives.
6See Appendix A.1 for a detailed description of the selected subclasses.
7For a detailed list with the questionaire see Appendix A.2.
8SATPAY (satisfaction with pay) has to be interpreted as a compensation for non-wage job char-
acteristics (here F1 and F2). If workers are satisfied with their wage, wages are (subjective) overly
compensating for either good or bad working conditions.
9A Mann-Whitney test is a nonparametric test to verify if two samples originate from the same
population or not. There is no a priori assumption about the distribution of the population. See for a
good introduction (Noether 1991).
11
3.2 Results
Table 5 in Appendix A.3 reports results of one-sided Mann-Whitney tests for job char-
acteristics. We compared every pair of subclasses within every group considered. In the
following we use the abbreviations MAIN for the [max–max, max–min] equilibrium and
SEC for the [max–max, min–min] equilibrium. In Table 1 results for group “Production,
processing and preserving of meat and meat products” are presented10.
F1 F2 WAGE SATPAY
(11) Meat-production & processing
(12) Poultry-production & processing
* *
(11) Meat-production & processing
(13) Meat & poultry products
** **
(11) Meat-production & processing
(14) Meat & poultry processing
(12) Poultry-production & processing
(13) Meat & poultry products
** *** ** **
(12) Poultry-production & processing
(14) Meat & poultry processing
* ** ***
(13) Meat & poultry products
(14) Meat & poultry processing
*** ***
Table 1: One-sided Mann-Whitney test for subclasses in the group “Production, process-
ing and preserving of meat and meat products” (* 10%, ** 5% and *** 1% level)
F1 and F2 are the grouped variables due to factor analysis. “SATPAY” means subjec-
tive satisfaction with remuneration and “WAGE” is the objective amount of the hourly
wage employees receive11. Greyshaded cells with stars signify that employees in the sec-
ond subclass are significantly more satisfied with one job characteristic than employees in
the first subclass. White cells with stars have to be interpreted vice versa. One can see
that only two comparisons of subclasses conform with our theoretical predictions for case
MAIN. Meat-producing and processing (11) and meat and poultry processing firms (14)
offer higher wages but less training and job security versus meat and poultry-products
producing firms (13). Case SEC is found for poultry-production and processing (12) ver-
sus meat and poultry products (13). Here wages are higher in poultry production but
employees have better job characteristics in meat and poultry products. SATPAY in this
comparison means that workers in (13) are more satisfied with their wage than in (12).
That is workers in (13) regard their wages high enough to compensate for their good work-
ing conditions. The other comparisons show no unique confirmation of our theoretical
results.
The second group we consider in detail is “Manufacture of other food products”.
What we can deduce from Table 2 is that workers in subclass “Sugar confectionery”
(34) get higher wages than in all other subclasses, but are more dissatisfied with training
and job security than in other subclasses except (35) “Other foods not classified else-
where”. Thus case MAIN can be found for the pairs 31/34, 32/34 and 33/34. Case SEC
is not existent in this group.
10The numbers in parenthesis in the first column refer to our own classification, see Appendix A.3.
11It is worthwhile to mention that wages are only measured on an ordinal scale, see Appendix A.2.
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F1 F2 WAGE SATPAY
(31) Bread, fresh pastry goods and cakes
(32) Rusks and biscuits, preserved pastry goods and cakes
** *
(31) Bread, fresh pastry goods and cakes
(33) Cocoa and chocolate confectionery
*
(31) Bread, fresh pastry goods and cakes
(34) Sugar confectionery
** *** *
(31) Bread, fresh pastry goods and cakes
(35) Other food products not elsewhere classified
(32) Rusks and biscuits, preserved pastry goods and cakes
(33) Cocoa and chocolate confectionery
*
(32) Rusks and biscuits, preserved pastry goods and cakes
(34) Sugar confectionery
*** ***
(32) Rusks and biscuits, preserved pastry goods and cakes
(35) Other food products not elsewhere classified
**
(33) Cocoa and chocolate confectionery
(34) Sugar confectionery
*** ***
(33) Cocoa and chocolate confectionery
(35) Other food products not elsewhere classified
**
(34) Sugar confectionery
(35) Other food products not elsewhere classified
***
Table 2: One-sided Mann-Whitney test for subclasses in the group “Manufacture of other
food products” (* 10%, ** 5% and *** 1% level)
The last group considered in detail is human health activities. In Table 3 we compare
the three subclasses public and private hospitals and medical nursing home activities.
F1 F2 WAGE SATPAY
(91) Public sector hospital activities
(92) Private sector hospital activities
*** ** ** **
(91) Public sector hospital activities
(93) Medical nursing home activities
*** *** ***
(92) Private sector hospital activities
(93) Medical nursing home activities
** *** ***
Table 3: One-sided Mann-Whitney test for subclasses in the group “Human health activ-
ities” (* 10%, ** 5% and *** 1% level)
Employees in subclass (93) “Medical nursing home activities” get higher wages than
in public (91) and private hospitals (92) but less training and job security12. Additionally
they are more satisfied with their pay than employees in private hospitals, hence we can
deduce that the remuneration WAGE is enough, roughly speaking, to compensate for
worse training opportunities and job security (F2). Employees in public hospitals are
more satisfied with job characteristics F1 and F2 than those in private hospitals but
get lower wages. Employees in public hospitals are more satisfied with their pay than
employees in private hospitals, which may indicate, that employees in public hospitals
12Our results for private versus public hospitals are consistent with the result of Almond and Kendall
(2000) comparing non-profit versus for-profit/government sectors as mentioned in the Introduction.
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are compensated by job characteristics F1 and F2 for lower wages. According to our
model, public hospitals should offer better job amenities due to worse remuneration.
Private hospitals offer better training and job security prospects while paying less than
medical nursing home activities. Thus case MAIN seem to apply to private hospitals
versus medical nursing home activities. Case SEC can be found for private versus public
hospitals and public hospitals versus medical nursing home activities. Additionally a
parametric t-test indicates that employees in public hospitals are more satisfied with
ACHIEVE, INFLUENCE, INITIATIVE and WORK (=F1) on an 1%-level of significance
than in private hospitals, no significant difference in SECURITY and TRAINING (=F2)
but employees in public hospitals get less paid. Thus, a parametric t-test verifies the
expected theoretical result: public and private hospitals compete in WAGE and one job
characteristic (=F1), while TRAINING and SECURITY seem to be very similar. Hence
with parametric testing case MAIN are also found for private versus public hospitals.
Based on these test, confirmation of our theoretical results can be found in some
subclasses. Referring to Table 5, 7 out of 37 comparisons between subclasses confirm our
results for case MAIN, 4 out of 37 comparisons case SEC and no differentiation of job
characteristics occur in 14 comparisons13. Differentiation in at least one job characteristic
but no compensation by a different wage can be found in 12 comparisons.
4 Conclusions
In this paper firms offer jobs with two non-wage characteristics. Both characteristics are
vertically differentiated, that means that in the view of all potential workers there exists
an optimal specification (qualities) of a job. Firms can offer high quality with no costs.
Workers differ in their willingness to substitute these qualities for wage. In equilibrium
firms offer differentiated jobs to discriminate between workers who call for high quality
and workers who are willing to accept lower quality in exchange for higher wages. Wages
will be differentiated although all workers have the same productivity in both firms and, as
usual in oligopsonistic markets, wages will be lower than in a competitive labour market.
If the non-wage characteristics are symmetrical in some sense (if the intervals within
the two characteristics lie is the same for both characteristics), then one firm will offer
jobs with highest quality in both characteristics and the competing firm will offer jobs
with highest quality in one and lowest quality in the other characteristic. Firms will
differentiate in one characteristic only. The old idea of minimal differentiation (Hotelling
1929) will be valid in this model at least in one of the characteristics. But firms try to
avoid wage competition and one of the characteristics is differentiated maximal for that
reason. The solution a social planer would prefer, highest quality in both characteristics,
is no equilibrium.
Empirically we use the dataset WERS (Workplace Employment Relations Survey), an
employee-employer data. We use job characteristics measured on an ordinal, subjective
basis. By comparing (UK SIC2003) subclasses and using a Mann-Whitney-Test to test for
differences in offered job characteristics between subclasses we found evidence that firms
do indeed compete in non-wage characteristics in order to retain and attract employees.
133 out of these 14 comparisons show that firms offer the same job characteristics but firms in the
respective subclasses offer different wages.
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In some sectors firms compete in one job characteristic only, as our simple theory predicts.
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Appendix A
A.1 Selected subclasses
Table 4 gives an overview about the treated subclasses. The first column indicates a num-
ber for the group to which classes or subclasses (column 2) belong14. Column 3 indicates
our own numbers for classes and subclasses beginning with 11 (group 1, (sub)class 1) and
ending with 93 (group 9, (sub)class 3). The last column describes the detailed activity
of a (sub)class. As variables we used the wage income per hour and the satisfaction of
employees concerning some job characteristics.
A.2 Variables
The questions were taking out of WERS (number A8 and E15), the employee question-
naire. The first question is about satisfaction of employees about job characteristics, the
second question about hourly wage rate.
How satisfied are you with the following aspects of your job?
• The sense of achievement you get from your work (ACHIEVE)
• The scope for using your own initiative (INITIATIVE)
• The amount of influence you have over your job (INFLUENCE)
• The training you receive (TRAINING)
• The amount of pay you receive (SATPAY)
• Your job security (SECURITY)
• The work itself (WORK)
Shortcuts used in the text are indicated in parenthesis.
It would be helpful if you could also tell us about your hourly pay. How much do you
get paid per hour, before tax and other deductions are taken out?
• £4.50 or less per hour
• £4.50-£5.00 per hour
• £5.01-£14.99 per hour
• £15.00 or more per hour
14DA, DE etc in column 2 refers to the subsections to which the group belongs to, e.g. DA is a
subsection of section D (“Manufacture”) and stands for “Manufacture of Food Products, Beverages and
Tobacco”
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SIC (2003) Our Name of subclassclassification
1
DA 15.11/1 11 Slaughtering of animals other than poultry and rabbits
DA 15.11/2 12 Animal by-product processing
DA 15.12 13 Production and preserving of poultry meat
DA 15.13/9 14 Other meat and poultry meat processing
2 DA 15.61/1 21 Grain millingDA 15.61/2 22 Manufacture of breakfast cereals and cereals-based foods
3
DA 15.81 31 Bread, fresh pastry goods and cakes
DA 15.82 32 Rusks and biscuits, preserved pastry goods and cakes
DA 15.84/1 33 Manufacture of cocoa and chocolate confectionery
DA 15.84/2 34 Manufacture of sugar confectionery
DA 15.89/9 35 Manufacture of other food products not elsewhere classified
4 DE 22.12 41 Publishing of newspaperDE 22.13 42 Publishing of journals and periodicals
5
DH 25.21 51 Manufacture of plastic plates, sheets, tubes and profiles
DH 25.22 52 Manufacture of plastic packing goods
DH 25.23 53 Manufacture of builders’ ware of plastic
DH 25.24 54 Manufacture of other plastic products
6
DK 29.22 61 Manufacture of lifting and handling equipment
DK 29.23 62 Manufacture of non-domestic cooling and ventilation equipment
DK 29.24 63 Manufacture of other general purpose machinery not elsewhere classified
7 DL 32.20/1 71 Manufacture of telegraph and telephone apparatus and equipmentDL 32.20/2 72 Manufacture of radio and electronic capital goods
8
DN 36.11 81 Manufacture of chairs and seats
DN 36.12 82 Manufacture of other office and shop furniture
DN 36.13 83 Manufacture of other kitchen furniture
DN 36.14 84 Manufacture of other furniture
9
N 85.11/1 91 Public sector hospital activities, including NHS Trusts
N 85.11/2 92 Private sector hospital activities
N 85.11/3 93 Medical nursing home activities
Table 4: Overview of subclasses used
A.3 Results
Greyshaded cells with stars have to interpreted as a significant higher satisfaction re-
garding a particular job characteristic in the second subclass and entries with no shaded
areas vice versa. F1 and F2 are grouped satisfaction variables due to factor analysis.
F1 combines ACHIEVE, INITIATIVE, INFLUENCE and WORK, F2 TRAINING and
SECURITY. WAGE is the hourly wage measured on an ordinal scale. SATPAY is satis-
faction of the employees with their remuneration. Numbers in the first column refer to
our classification defined in Appendix A.1.
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F1 F2 WAGE SATPAY
11/12 * *
11/13 ** **
11/14
12/13 ** *** ** **
12/14 * ** ***
13/14 *** ***
21/22 *** **
31/32 ** *
31/33 *
31/34 ** *** *
31/35
32/33 *
32/34 *** ***
32/35 **
33/34 *** ***
33/35 **
34/35 ***
41/42
51/52
51/53 ***
51/54
52/53 ** ***
52/54
53/54 * ** ***
61/62 ** * *
61/63 *** *** **
62/63 ** *** **
71/72 ** **
81/82 **
81/83
81/84 * *
82/83 *
82/84
83/84 * *
91/92 *** ** ** **
91/93 *** *** ***
92/93 ** *** ***
Table 5: Mann-Whitney test for differences in job characteristics (* 10%, ** 5% and ***
1% level)
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